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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent . 
vs. 
FARHAD SOROUSHIRIN, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
Case No. 14485 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Distribution, Not For Value, 
Of A Controlled Substance, to-wit: Marijuana, a felony, and commitment to 
the Utah State Division of Corrections for a period of not to exceed ninety 
(90) days, pursuant to Section 76-3-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as • 
amended. (R. 59) The case was tried before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, 
sitting without a jury. From the conviction and the commitment defendant-
appellant appeals. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was charged by information with the crime of Distribution 
For Value Of A Controlled Substance, to-wit: Marijuana, in violation of 
Sec. 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), Utah Code Anno. 1953, as amended. (R.6) At 
arraignment the trial court rejected appellant's plea of once in jeopardy 
and denied his motion to dismiss on ground of: (1) Entrapment, 
(2) Double jeopardy, and (3) Denial of a speedy trial. (R.9-10 and R.23-30) 
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Appellant's not guilty plea was entered and the matter set for trial. 
Defendant was unable to locate a key witness (R.14, 34) and 
on the date set for trial, moved the court for an order compelling the 
State to produce the witness. (Tr.3) Appellant's motion was denied and 
the case was heard by the trial judge sitting without jury. 
The trial judge found appellant "not guilty of the major 
offense...because of entrapment". He then found the defendant guilty of 
the "lesser offense" of "Distributing Not For Value". (Tr.103) 
Appellant moved for a judgment of acquital. (R.40-48) After 
the hearing the court denied the motion and committed appellant to the 
custody of the Division of Corrections for a period of ninety (90) days 
for evaluation prior to sentencing. (R.59) 
Notice of appeal was filed (R.50) and the trial judge issued 
a Certificate of Probable Cause and Order Admitting Defendant to Bail 
Pending Appeal. (R.51,52) 
Vi>
---*-'' -• RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL : l 
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and/or a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September of 1974, Ogden Police Officer L. J. Call was 
assigned to Weber State College as an "under cover agent".(Tr.46) He was 
provided a room in a college dormitory and enrolled in four classes by the 
Weber State College Security Office, (Tr.68) The class enrollment was a 
"front" to hide his investigations of certain professors at the college. 
(Tr.47,48) 
The officer characterized his duties as follows: "My duty was 
_ o _ 
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t 
to find some individual and get him to sell me some type of narcotics, 
then we would make a complaint against him." (Tr.48) 
He describes his mode of operation as follows: "I would just roam the 
streets, sit in cafes, sit in the temple grounds, make friends, and when I 
felt it was time, I would ask them if they had any marijuana to purchase or 
knew of anyone who could sell me some." (Tr.35) 
He "befriended" a young black student named Terrell Eady and led him 
to believe he was his close friend. (Tr.M-M-) The officer engineered a number 
of "pot" parties with Mr. Eady. At least one party was in the officer's 
dormitory apartment and others were in the officerTs automobile.(Tr.M-5) 
On October 29, 197*4, Officer Call and Mr. Eady discussed getting some 
marijuana. Mr. Eady said he "knew some individuals who would have some." 
Officer Call drove him to three or four homes but they were unable to find 
anyone who could or would sell them anything. (Tr.41) 
Finally the officer testified, Mr. Eady indicated "He knew a Persian 
up on Harrison who possibly could have some or know someone who would have 
some marijuana." Officer Call drove Mr. Eady to the Eastridge Apartments 
where defendant lived. Mr. Eady went alone to the apartment and Officer 
Call remained in his automobile. (Tr.42) 
Mr. Eady returned with Mr. Soroushirn, the appellant, and made intro-
ductions. Officer Call stated that he could recall no conversation with 
Mr. Soroushirn including any form of instruction as to where to go or how 
to get there. (Tr.66) Apparently Mr. Eady took the initiative and told the 
officer what had to be done. (Tr.43) The officer then drove Messrs. Eady 
and Soroushirn to an address on 26th Street. There the officer gave appel-
lant $20 and told him to get two bags of marijuana. Mr. Soroushirn left 
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the vehicle and went alone into an apartment building and x^ eturned with the 
marijuana. Later Officer Call drove Mr. Soroushirn back to his apartment 
and testified he gave him a "couple of joints" for his efforts. (Tr,60-61) 
Throughout the following week, Officer Call made repeated visits to 
Mr. SoroushirnTs apartment, for the purpose of inducing appellant to buy 
marijuana from his "contact." (Tr.65) He stated, ,!,,.I went there a number 
of times and sometimes he was there and sometimes he wasn1:t<" Each time the 
officer contacted the appellant, he asked, "Can you get me some or can your 
contact get me some?" (Tr,52) 
On each of these occasions, the officer's attempts were rebuffed and he saw 
nothing to indicate that appellant had any personal supply of marijuana or that 
he was engaged in selling the same. (Tr.53) On November 5, 1974, the officer 
went again to Mr. Soroushirn!s apartment and tT.. .asked him if his contact had 
any marijuana." Appellant finished dressing and accompanied him to the same 
address on 26th Street they had gone to eight days earlier. (Tr.37) 
The officer gave appellant two twenty-dollar bills and asked for four 
bags of marijuana. Appellant went into the apartment and returned with the 
marijuana. (Tr.37,38) Officer Call returned appellant to his apartment 
where, according to the officer1s statement, appellant rolled and kept two 
joints. (Tr.39) 
Mr. Sorourshirn was first prosecuted for the events which occurred on 
October 29, 1974. Following preliminary hearing and arraignment in District 
Court, he filed a motion for dismissal on grounds of "Entrapment". The 
hearing was held on May 21, 1975. At the hearing Mr. Terrell Eady testified. 
The court took the entrapment motion under advisement and set the matter for 
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trial on May 29, 1975. (Tr.83) The trial date was set at the appellant's 
request to assure Mr. EadyTs availability to testify before his departure 
from the area after the school term was completed. (Tr.51,84) 
On May 22, 1975, the day after the entrapment hearing on the first 
prosecution, Officer Call was summoned to the county attorney's office and 
told to sign a second complaint against the appellant. The complaint was 
to cover the second purchase which had occurred November 5, 1974. (Tr.50) 
The prosecutor then called appellant's attorney and advised him that 
".. .the case would be dismissed on the date of the trial and that your 
client wouldn't have to appear.1' (Tr.94) 
No mention was made of the second complaint and neither legal counsel, 
appellant, or Mr. Eady had any notice that a second prosecution was contem-
plated when the prosecutor appeared with defense counsel on May 28, 1975, 
and dismissed the first prosecution "with prejudice." (Tr.93) 
After the second complaint was signed on May 22, 1975, the prosecutor 
did not seek an arrest warrant or issue a summons. (Tr.86) Approximately 
six weeks later the warrant was issued and Mr. Soroushirn was arrested and 
forced to post a fifteen hundred dollar bail. (R.2) 
At arraignment in district court, on the second prosecution, appellant 
moved to dismiss, raising the defenses of: (1) entrapment, (2) double 
jeopardy, and (3) denial of speedy trial. (R.9-10) Hearing on the motion 
was set for October 1, 1975.
 f 
Appellant sought to subpoena Terrell Eady on the issue of entrapment, 
but the subpoena was returned unserved with a notation by Lt. Price of the 
Weber County Sheriff's Department that Mr. Eady was in Florida, (R.1U) 
The State was given notice at that time of the need for Mr. Eady's testi-
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mony at trial, (Motion to Dismiss, Tr,2) 
The case was set for trial on January 27,1976, Appellant appeared 
and moved the court for an order compelling the State to produce Terrell 
Eady as a key witness for appellant. (Tr,3) The court denied the motion 
and ordered the case to trial. (Tr.ll) 
After hearing the evidence, the trial judge, sitting without a jury, 
found the appellant "nox guilty of the major offense,,.because of entrap^ 
ment." However, he found appellant guilty of the tTlesser offense?T of 
"Distributing Not For Value", asserting that entrapment "in this case" is 
only a "partial defense." (Tr.103) 
POINT I , 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN HOLDING ENTRAPMENT IS ONLY A PARTIAL DEFENSE 
Appellant was charged and stood trial for the offense of "Distributing 
For Value a Controlled Substance, to-wit: Marijuana, a felony." (R.1,6) 
The trial judge found the appellant "not guilty of the major offense... 
because of entrapment." The judge then found appellant "guilty" of a 
"lesser offense of Distributing Not For Value", also a felony, asserting that 
entrapment "in this case" is only a "partial defense." (Tr.103) 
The Utah Legislature has established "entrapment" as a complete defense 
to criminal responsibility and provides "should the court determine that 
the defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice..." 
76-2-303, U.C.A., 1953 as amended. Having found that entrapment occured as 
to the offense tried, the court was bound to dismiss the prosecution with 
prejudice. It was not at liberty to substitute a new felony charge and enter 
a finding of guilt without notice or hearing. 
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Even without the testimony of Mr. Eady, it is hard to conceive of a 
nore patent case of entrapment than the one now before this Court. The 
evidence shows that the Ogden City Police and Weber State College Security 
Office embarked on a crusade to expose criminal activities at the college 
in the Fall of 1974. (Tr.68) 
The plan was ill-conceived and poorly implemented from the outset. 
L. J. Call, an undercover agent, was placed in the college dormitory and 
enrolled in classes for the purpose of investigating the professors. 
(Tr.48) When assigned to Weber State College, he had approximately one 
monthTs experience on the force. (Tr.46) He had difficulty conceptualizing 
his duties and responsibilities. He testified his duty was "...to find some 
individual and get him to sell me some type of narcotics, then we would 
make a complaint against him." (Tr.48) 
He was generously endowed with taxpayers' money which he freely expended 
on "pot parties" in his dormitory and automobile and while roaming the 
streets, cafes and temple grounds, trying to "make friends" so that he could 
ask them if they had any marijuana to purchase or knew of anyone who would 
sell to him. His supervisor testified that the amount of money funnelled 
through the officer to purchase marijuana during his brief stay at the 
college "would probably" be less than $1,000.00. (Tr.75) 
After "befriending" a young black student named Terrell Eady and 
juicing him up with pot parties (Tr.45), he undertook to chauffeur Mr. 
Eady around town for the purpose of soliciting marijuana purchases from his 
friends. The officer testified that prior to calling on Mr. Soroushirn 
they had indiscriminately solicited four or five of Mr. Eadyfs friends with 
negative results. (Tr.41) He knew the identities of none of those soli-
cited including appellant and had no reason to believe any were engaged 
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in sale or use of marijuana. (Tr.44) 
Criminal investigations of this sort tend to be self-defeating. Such 
police conduct increases criminal activity or introduces it where it did not 
exist earlier. The emergence of public funds to buy marijuana could and did 
act as a magnet to draw marijuana to the college. Courts and lawmakers have 
sought to curb such excesses through a number of avenues, including codifi-
cation of the defense of entrapment. Utah law provides: 
"Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or person 
directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces 
the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of 
the commission for prosecution by methods creating a sub-
stantial risk that the offense would be committed by one 
not otherwise ready to commit it." Sec.76-2-303, U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended. 
In making entrapment a complete defense to criminal responsibility and 
providing "Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it 
shall dismiss the case with prejudice...", the Legislature left no doubt 
as to the legal significance of entrapment. Having found entrapment as to 
the facts before it in this case, the trial court had no discretion but was 
bound to dismiss the prosecution with prejudice. The trial judge erred by 
substituting charges and entering a finding of guilt without notice or 
hearing on the "lesser offense." 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT >S PLEA OF FORMER 
JEOPARDY 
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of "once in jeopardy" and 
asked the court to dismiss this action. (R.9-10, 23-29) The motion was 
denied. (R.30) 
On two occasions, October 29, 1974, and November 5, 1974, Officer L. J. 
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Call obtained Mr. Soroushirn?s assistance in purchasing marijuana. During 
the period between these two dates the officer made several unsuccessful 
attempts to buy through appellant. (Tr.52-54) 
The County Attorney treated the two incidents as separate offenses 
and immediately prosecuted appellant for the incident that occurred on 
October 29, 1974. The Chief Criminal Deputy advised the court that it was 
an established policy in ndrug cases" to file one case and have other 
"holding cases" that can be used for "either negotiating purposes or for 
other reasons". (Motion to Dismiss, Tr.20) 
After arraignment in District Court on the first charge appellant 
raised the defense of entrapment. A hearing was held and the prosecutor 
heard the testimony of Mr. Terrell Eady on the question of entrapment. -Mr. 
Eady had introduced Officer Call to appellant and appeared to direct matters 
as to how the purchase was effected. CTr.43,-6) 
The entrapment hearing was held May 21, 1975, while Mr. Eady was engaged 
in final exams at Weber State College. He advised the court of his plans to 
leave Utah after the end of the school term. The entrapment issue was taken 
under advisement and the trial was set for May 29, 1975, to assure Mr. 
EadyTs availability in event the matter went to trial. (Tr.51,84) 
The prosecutor acknowledged that Mr. Eady was a "good witness" (Tr.97) 
and that "there might be a finding of not guilty in that case." He went on 
to state "We feared that he might be completely exonerated of the first case 
and the evidence should not be brought up." (Tr. 87) 
Following the entrapment hearing the prosecution developed a new trial 
stratagy. A second complaint citing the incident that occurred on November 
5, 1974, the second of the two alleged marijuana purchases, was obtained. 
The complaint was signed on May 22, 1975, the day after the entrapment 
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hearing on the first prosecution and six and one-half months after the alleged 
incident. -. 
The prosecutor then called Mr. Soroushirin1 s attorney and told him he 
would dismiss the first prosecution and not to prepare for trial. He advised 
counsel that appellant need not appear. (Tr. 94) 
No warrant or summons was issued regarding the second case and no notice 
of its existence was given until appellant1s arrest on July 7, 1975, eight 
months after the incident and six weeks after Mr. EadyTs planned departure 
from the state. (Tr. 86, 93) 
The prosecutor knew that Mr. Eady was on court-imposed probation and 
could be located through his probation officer. (Tr. 89-90) However, he 
offered no assistance or information to appellant even though he knew of 
appellant's many attempts to locate the witness. (R.14-, R.34, Motion to 
Dismiss, Tr.2) 
The State is estopped from prosecuting this action under the doctrine 
of Collateral Estoppel as .outlined in Ash v. Swensen, 397 U.S. 4-36, 25 L.Ed. 
469, 90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970). Collateral Estoppel is applied when an issue of 
ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment to assure 
that the issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any 
future lawsuit. In Ash, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the princi-
ples of Collateral Estoppel are embodied in the Fifth Amendment's guarantee 
against double jeopardy and is thus binding on state prosecutions. 
Ash involved an armed robbery of six poker players. The accused was 
tried and acquitted of robbing one of the players. The State then tried and 
convicted him of robbing another of the players. In reversing the conviction 
the Supreme Court noted that where there has been a prior acquittal at court 
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should: 
"...examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the 
pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude 
whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue 
other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from considera-
tion. The inquiry 'must be set in a practical frame and viewed with 
an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedingsr. " 
In applying this standard the Supreme Court looked to the facts in 
each robbery prosecution and decided, 
"...the record is utterly devoid of any indication that the first 
jury could rationally have found that an armed robbery had not 
occurred, or that Knight had not been a victim of that robbery. 
The single rationally conceived issue in dispute before the jury was 
whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers. And the jury by 
its verdict found that he had not...therefore, a second prosecution 
for the robbery of Roberts is wholly impermissible." 397 U.S. 445 
In the case at bar the only issue raised as to either prosecution was 
entrapment. Where there are multiple purchases of a controlled substance 
from a defendant by the same officer as part of a single investigation the 
court must look to the initial inducement to determine the existence or 
non-existence of entrapment. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 
2 L. Ed.2d 848, 78 S. Ct. 819 (1958) 
When the county fs chief criminal deputy dismissed the first prosecution 
of appellant to avoid an acquittal based upon Mr. Eadyrs entrapment testi-
mony (Tr.86-87, the State is estopped from litigating the issue again. 
•^
n
 Ash, supra, there were none of the oppressive tactical maneuvers 
present in the case at bar. The prosecutor had not resorted to tactical 
delays and concealment of witnesses to secure the conviction. The State 
merely treated the first trial as a "dry run for the second prosecution." 
Even this approach the Supreme Court specifically forbid. 397 U.S. 447 
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POINT III 
PROSECUTORIAL DELAY AND THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO ORDER THE STATE TO PRODUCE A KEY WITNESS FOR DEFENSE DEPRIVED 
APPEL1ANT OF A FAIR AND SPEEDY TRIAL. 
An accused's right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his . 
favor is outlined in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution 
of the United States and Art. I, Sec. 12 of the Constitution of Utah, 
There was an eight-month delay between the incident complained of and 
notice to the accused of the prosecution. In the interim, appellant was 
led to believe that the State had terminated efforts to prosecute and 
appellant's key witness was allowed to leave the state. 
Prior to trial appellant exhausted all avenues open to him to locate 
the witness (R.14, 34, Tr.10), and moved the court for an Order Compelling 
the State to Produce the VJitness. (Tr.3) The trial judge denied appellant's 
request even though it was subsequently disclosed at trial that the witness 
sought was under the court's control as part of a court-Imposed probation 
and thus could be located through his probation officer. (Tr.89,90) 
The extent to which appellant was prejudiced by Mr. EadyTs testimony 
is demonstrated by the trial judge's verdict. The judge, in support of his 
verdict, declared: 
"...the court believes that the defendant stood ready, willing and able 
to share with others the possession, use and division of marijuana." 
(Tr.102) 
This conclusion graphically illustrates the need for Mr. Eady's testi-
mony. Only he could advise the court why he had told Officer Call that 
appellant could possibly have some marijuana or know someone who had some. 
(Tr.42) Only Mr. Eady could tell the court why defendant acceeded to Mr. 
Eady's demands that appellant help "his friend", Officer Call, obtain 
marijuana. 
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One can understand why the State did not want Mr, Eady exposing any 
more police excesses but the prosecutionTs trial tactics should not have 
been condoned by the trial judge. (Tr. 102) 
See United States v. Currey, 384 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. 111. 1968), holding 
that an abnormal delay between commission of a series of alleged drug 
transactions and notice to the accused upon arrest of pending charges con-
stitutes denial of the essentials of a fair trial and due process of law 
with respect to an accused who is unable to locate a government undercover 
agent without whose testimony accused!s claim of entrapment cannot be 
satisfactorily resolved. 
POINT IV. 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED TRIAL BY JURY 
At the time set for trial appellant moved the court for an order 
compelling the State to produce Mr. Terrell Eady as a witness for defense. 
The court was advised that appellant was unprepared to proceed without the 
witness. CTr.3,6) The trial judge denied the motion and proceeded to try 
the case sitting without a jury. 
The State had not subpoened a jury in anticipation of appellant's 
motion to compel production of the witness. The right to trial by jury is 
guaranteed under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of 
the United States and Art. I, Sec. 12 of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
Under Utah law a defendant may waive trial by jury but "Such waiver 
shall be made in open court and entered in the minutes." Sec. 77-27-2, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
The clerk entered the notation "Defendant waived his right to trial 
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1 
by jury" in the minutes, (Tr<36) The basis for the entry remains unexplained. 
There is nothing in the transcript of proceedings to support it which rebuts 
any inference that a waiver was ?!made in open courtn as required by law,. 
Appellant, at no time, in or out of court, knowingly waived his right to 
jury trial. Accordingly this conviction must be vacated, 
CONCLUSION 
The assigned errors made mockery of due process. The conduct of this 
trial never approached acceptable standards for a fair trial. Appellant 
prays that the judgment and sentence be reversed and set aside. 
Respectfully Submitted 
WILLIAM D. MARSH 
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant 
Suite 1, Estate House 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 844-01 
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